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Information and Arena. The Dual Function of the News Media for Political Elites 
 
Abstract 
How do individual politicians use the news media to reach their political goals? This study 
addresses the question by proposing an actor-centered, functional approach. We distinguish 
two essential functions (and sub-functions) the mass media have for political elites. The 
media are a source of information; politicians depend on it for pure information and they can 
profit from the momentum generated by media information. The media also are an arena elites 
need access to in order to promote themselves and their issues. These two functions offer 
certain politicians a structural advantage over others and, hence, are relevant for the power 
struggle among political elites. A systematic functional account allows to compare the role of 
the media across politicians and political systems. 
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Information and Arena. The Dual Function of the News Media for Political Actors 
 
Introduction 
Social scientists have had a lot of attention for the news media’s impact on public opinion 
(see for example for one of the earliest accounts: Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1945). 
Until recently the relationship between news media and political elites received much less 
attention. Classic studies focusing on the power relationship between journalists and 
politicians were mainly interested in news making—and thus in the influence from politics on 
media—and less in policy making—the influence from media on politics (e.g. Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1981; Gans, 1979; Nimmo, 1964; Sigal, 1973; but see Cook, 1989). But during the 
last decade or so, the political consequences of the alleged intrusion of the news media in the 
political sphere gained considerable scholarly traction (e.g. Davis, 2010; Strömbäck, 2008; 
Wolfe, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2013).  
So far, the media and politics literature has mainly focused on how journalists and their 
news products have influenced the world of politics. The mediatization literature, for 
example, analyzes mainly how politics has adapted to the rules of the media logic. This work 
basically studies the media’s intrusion into the political sphere and suggests that the media are 
politically influential (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). A different approach comes from scholars 
that study the impact of the news media on political priorities. Students of the political agenda 
contend that media coverage affects the priorities of presidents, parliaments and parties (e.g. 
AUTHORS, 2006). Although mediatization and political agenda-setting scholars differ in 
their account of how the media influence politics, they share the idea that political elites and 
institutions follow the media, and that the media thus possess at least some form of political 
power. When asked directly, many political elites agree that the media exert substantial 
power. A recent survey among politicians in nine European countries found that politicians 




perceive the media to have a large agenda-setting and ‘career-controlling’ power (Lengauer, 
Donges, & Plasser, 2014). A host of other individual-level studies confirmed that political 
actors are strongly convinced of the media’s power (Cohen, Tsfati, & Sheafer, 2008; Maurer, 
2011; AUTHORS, 2011). In sum, most theories and studies have focused on the 
relationship—better: the power struggle—between media and politics. This is what Gans 
(1979) labeled as the ‘tango’ between journalists and politicians, a metaphor that has been 
used repeatedly in the literature. 
Apart from the fact that in most of this work the mass media have been posited ‘against’ 
politics—news media are implicitly considered to be a kind of ‘foreign intruder’ into 
politics—the relationship between media and politics has hardly been investigated from the 
perspective of political actors themselves. About fifteen years ago, Schudson (2002: 255) 
noticed in his overview of the media and politics literature that there were hardly studies that 
“look to the media from the viewpoint of politicians”. Only more recently, a growing 
literature is putting the political process center stage by discussing the role of the mass media 
from the perspective of political actors. The PMP-model of Wolfsfeld (2011), for instance, 
holds that most things ultimately start in the political realm, then spill over to the media, and 
that, subsequently, political actors react to the media coverage (they themselves caused). In a 
similar way, Sellers’ (2010) ‘cycle of spin’ starts with politicians willing to promote their 
message; these politicians take into account how their messages are covered in the media 
which, in turn, influences their political communication and even the policy debate. Also 
Entman’s (2003) cascading model departs from the promotion of frames by political and 
bureaucratic elites but acknowledges the existence of an important feedback role of the news 
media. 
Without denying the importance of the media, all these scholars start and end their 
analysis with the actions and goals of political actors. They adopt a political actor perspective 




and suggest that the media’s impact mainly works via political actors that are (un)able to 
employ the media to further their goals (see also Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010; Thesen, 2014). Such 
an alternative view of the media-politics relationship departing from the perspective of 
political elites is also gaining ground in recent studies on the mediatization of politics. For 
example, Esser and Strömbäck (2014: 227) observe a shift from a ‘media-centric’ to an ‘actor-
centric’ perspective in mediatization research. More and more mediatization scholars seem to 
support the idea that the media matter not so much because political actors are forced to adapt 
to their logic, but rather because they (selectively) choose to adapt in so far as it fits their 
political purposes (see also Authors, 2014; Landerer, 2013; Marcinkowski & Steiner, 2014). 
In other words, instead of pitching the mass media against political elites, the emerging actor 
perspective suggests that the media may have an impact on the struggle of power among 
different political elites. Although gaining ground, the political actor approach still lacks a 
systematic theoretical account that explicitly incorporates and compares the different 
functions the media perform for political elites. 
Therefore, as a first step towards such a theory, our ambition here is to provide a 
functional framework of the meaning and role of the mass media for political elites in 
Western democracies. Our approach is ‘functional’ as it zooms in on the different functions 
the media have for politicians. A functional approach was quite common among the pioneers 
of mass communication research. For example, a long time ago, Harold Lasswell suggested 
several functions the media have for society at large (Lasswell, 1948; see also Graber, 2009). 
Building on his insights, other scholars studied the functions the mass media have for 
individual citizens, which became known as the ‘uses and gratifications’ approach (Katz, 
Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973a). These scholars typically generated a list of functions that 
different media might have in satisfying different sorts of citizen needs (e.g. Katz, Haas, & 
Gurevitch, 1973b). This mass communication work strongly contributed to a shift in thinking 




about media effects from “what the media do to people” to “what the people do with media”. 
We believe such a functional approach to be a fruitful way to study the role of media in 
politics; it directly addresses some of the shortcoming in previous studies on media and 
politics. 
First, a functional approach focuses on why politicians use the mass media and provides 
systematic insights in the motives that underlie their interaction with the media. The 
importance of the media as a channel to reach the broader audience, for example, is more 
often suggested than actually examined. A functional approach can help us with 
understanding how and why some politicians use the media under certain circumstances while 
others do not, or are not able to. By focusing on the motives of politicians, a functional actor 
approach is well-suited for comparative research comparing different politicians in different 
systems. In fact, similar goals can be expected to motivate elected politicians in many systems 
but the constraints, resources and incentives provided by the political and media system may 
vary leading to systematic differences. 
Second, a functional approach is in line with the widely accepted idea among political 
scientists that politicians are strategic actors with specific goals and ambitions that try to 
pursue those goals as good as they can (Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2013). It treats the media as 
a resource that can be used by politicians in the struggle over political power with other 
politicians. For instance, by attaining media access, anticipating media attention, or 
rhetorically using media coverage, politicians can improve their position in the political 
process (see also Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012). In this way, a functional perspective examines 
whether and how media affect the balance of power amongst politicians, which probably is 
the main question political scientists deal with—namely: who gets what, when and how. 
In short, we argue that a systematic analysis of the existing literature about media and 
politics through a functional lens leads to novel and coherent insights about the role of the 




media in the political process. We focus specifically on elected politicians in Western 
democracies as the units of analysis. This means we exclude other political actors such as 
social movement activists, leading civil servants, or non-elected authoritarian leaders. 
However, as we will briefly discuss at the end, we acknowledge the variety among political 
actors and reckon the functions of the mass media may play out differently for non-elite 
political actors in other positions. 
Looking at the news media from a functional perspective, we argue the mass media 
essentially fulfill a dual function for political actors. Based on an extensive literature review, 
this article makes the distinction between the media as a source of information for political 
actors, and the media as an arena for political communication. Within the information 
function we further distinguish a passive from an active information sub-function. Politicians 
can learn from the media about the world out there, including the opinions of the public and 
other political actors. Yet, the fact that information encapsulated in media coverage is, by 
definition, also public creates a window of opportunity and politicians can profit from the 
momentum generated by the media information on a topic. The arena function as well has two 
sub-functions. On the one hand, politicians try to get access to the media arena to get attention 
and favorable coverage for them personally. On the other hand, politicians use the media 
arena to promote certain issues and their interpretation of these issues. 
The study first discusses and conceptualizes the two central functions, information and 
arena, and their sub-functions. Next, we show how these two functions have been implicitly 
underlying much of the existing literature and how previous work can be structured according 
to the dual media function. We then move on to how our functional approach allows to 
investigate differences across actors and across political systems in how politicians use, and 
are dependent on the mass media. This then suggests a future research agenda. 
 




The Two Functions of the Media for Political Elites 
First, the mass media form a source of information for political elites. Just like any citizen, 
individual politicians learn from the media about the world out there, even about the world of 
politics. The information the media offer is diverse and ranges from signaling the importance 
of societal problems to highlighting the positions other actors have taken towards those 
problems. What we call ‘information’ here can be a simple fact, like the actual inflation rate, 
as well as a government statement about the need to control inflation. So, the media provide 
politicians with information that they would otherwise not have or not pay attention to. But 
attention is scarce. Any topic can only draw a finite amount of time, space, money, resources, 
etc. Due to the architecture of the human mind and institutional limitations, the amount of 
attention is limited, since other topics are begging for attention as well. The assumption of 
attention scarcity applies to citizens (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), to politicians and the political 
system as a whole (Simon, 1985; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005), as well as to media coverage 
(Boydstun, 2013). The more attention the media devote to something—this is mostly a matter 
of the sheer prominence of a story in the news—the more the implicit message is conveyed 
that it is something important. In short, the media do not only make information available but 
also make it more salient, giving politicians an idea of what issues or persons are currently in 
the public eye. This first sub-function is purely informational; it relates to the passive role of 
politicians as mere consumers of information provided by the media. 
Yet, politicians not only passively learn from the information provided by the mass 
media, they also actively use it in their daily work, this is the second information sub-
function. If real world events or other political actors’ plans for action or statements are 
covered by the news, this signal presents raw material for (other) political actors to factor in, 
or not, into their own actions, strategizing or positioning. In other words, information 
generates an opportunity for politicians to act and this is especially the case when that 




information is public, which is by definition the case with news media information. 
Information then becomes an instrument that can be used strategically by politicians to 
support their own goals or plans. This use can range from a backbencher using media 
coverage rhetorically in parliament to support a claim, over a party leader using the media 
momentum to put the party’s issue higher on the governmental agenda, to a president using a 
massively covered accident to push his policy plans through parliament. 
Second, the mass media as a whole form a political arena. Elites use this arena to reach 
out to the public. In many ways, the media arena is comparable to other arenas, such as the 
parliamentary arena. Competing actors make statements, undertake actions and try to get the 
upper hand. There are specific rules of conduct that apply to playing in the media arena, just 
like there are rules for how to act in the parliamentary arena or government arena. The notion 
that politics occurs in different political arenas is a classic idea in political science, in 
particular in the party literature (e.g. Muller, 2000; Strøm, Müller, & Smith, 2010; Sjöblom, 
1968; Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2013). Each arena has different inclusion and exclusion 
criteria and is ruled by different procedures. While party scholars typically devote little or no 
attention to the mass media as a political arena, Strömbäck (2007) suggests that political 
actors also act in a media arena, where they interact with journalists and editors and try to 
maximize positive and minimize negative publicity. Also Lawrence (2001) considers the 
media as an arena in which problems and events are identified and defined through the 
interaction of different actors. The media arena does not operate separately from the other 
arenas; it influences and is influenced by what happens in the other venues (Strömbäck & Van 
Aelst, 2013; Kedrowksi, 1996; Sellers, 2010). Yet, for clarity’s sake, we think it is fruitful to 
conceptualize the media arena as a distinct arena in its own right. 
Politicians use the media arena in the first place to promote themselves, this is the first 
arena sub-function. At least those who hold an elected mandate, want to get publically known 




and therefore need to be into the news. Therefore, gaining media arena access is one of the 
key intermediary goals of most politicians. As many people (not only political elites) vie to be 
part of the news, the news media are very selective in letting politicians pass through their 
selection gates. News routines and news values make the media devote attention to some 
actors while neglecting others. In particular among lower ranked politicians, this leads to a 
fierce competition for the scarce space in the newspapers columns or TV shows. 
Elites do not only require simple access to the media arena for self-promotion, they 
also aim to tell their own story in the media. This second arena sub-function could be labeled 
issue-promotion. Different actors have different stories to tell, or at least different versions of 
the story. They want to ‘spin’ an issue to their advantage, define it in a way that benefits them 
and the policies they favor. This implies that there is a ‘framing competition’ (Chong & 
Druckman, 2013) between political actors over the definition of the news. Journalists have an 
active role in this process and prefer sources to play a predefined part in their story, the 
narrative of the events that the journalist is putting together.  
By performing both functions at the same time, the role of information provider and of 
arena for promotion, the news media form a formidable resource for politicians affecting the 
power balance amongst political actors. The following section reviews the research literature 
from this bi-functional perspective and shows that the two functions (implicitly) underlie a 
large part of the extant work on media and politics.  
 
The Information Function 
Information is a crucial asset for politicians in their daily work (Baumgartner and Jones 
2014). There are at least three types of information encapsulated in media coverage. First, 
media offer easy to digest information about prevailing problems in society. The ultimate job 
of politicians is to deal with societal problems (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2009) and the 




media are routinized and specialized detection instruments constantly digging up dirt and 
signaling problems across many policy sectors. In particular novel information produced by 
the media, for example through investigative journalism, has a high informative value and is 
frequently followed-up by political action (Cook et al., 1983; Protess et al., 1991). The 
attractiveness of the media information about problems lies in the fact that media signals are 
succinct and focused, which is according to Kingdon (1984) the type of information that is 
preferred by politicians. Cobb and Elder (1981: 392) claim that the media are useful for 
political actors to ‘reduce the overwhelming information-processing tasks confronting 
policymakers’. Similarly, Kingdon (1984) showed how US members of Congress dealing 
with an oversupply of information turn to the media to know what really matters. 
Second, from the media, politicians also learn about public opinion. They do so directly 
if media messages contain explicit information about what the public cares about and wants 
(e.g. media stories referring to opinion polls or containing popular exemplars). Politicians also 
learn indirectly about the public as they consider the news a proxy for the priorities and the 
positions held by voters (Herbst, 1998). Pritchard (1992: 105) calls this the ‘media-as-
surrogate-for-public-opinion’-function of the media.  
There is a third type of information politicians get out of the media: information about 
the agenda, the positions and the actions of other politicians. Decision-making processes 
often take place behind closed doors. Politicians thus regularly lack information about what is 
going on in politics itself, and what other actors are up to. Quite often, information about the 
policy process leaks out in the press (Hess, 1984; Reich, 2008). Additionally, the media 
simply cover politics—the statements politicians make, the plans they launch, the visits they 
undertake etc.—and for a politician this may yield relevant information about what other 
(often more important) politicians (e.g. from the government) are up to (Linsky, 1986). In 




sum, politicians also learn from the media because its coverage contains (otherwise hidden) 
information about other political actors (Brown, 2010: 134; Sellers 2010: 8-9). 
All this work on how politicians vie for information about problems, public opinion and 
what other actors are doing suggests that the media are a provider of sheer information for 
politicians. However, actual empirical work directly investigating the purely informational 
sub-function of the media for politicians is as good as entirely missing. Although studies have 
shown that most politicians are news junkies (e.g. AUTHOR et al., 2008; Davis, 2007), we 
know little about what they learn from it. There are hardly studies on the ‘media dependency’ 
of political actors. This is in sharp contrast to the attention that has been given to the 
information function of the media for ordinary citizens (e.g. the classic study about how the 
public depends on media information: Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976). Studies are lacking as 
well that compare the role of the media as information provider with alternative sources of 
information such as interest groups, government agencies, ordinary citizens, party agencies 
etc.. Again, this is in contrast with the attention that is given in ‘uses and gratification’ 
research to alternative information sources (Katz et al., 1973b). The problem is that learning is 
a cognitive process and that scholars studying elites almost never get such close access to 
elites to actually study how these individual process information. There are plenty of studies, 
though, that show that elites act upon media information, but these studies tell us probably 
more about the second informational sub-function, namely how media information creates an 
opportunity for strategic political actors. 
Indeed, the empirical proof of the fact that politicians actively use the information 
provided by the media is substantial. There is a growing body of work about elites’ attentional 
behavior;  media signals about issues do get picked up by elites. Observing the media-reactive 
behavior of political actors, this literature strongly suggests that politicians derive information 
from media coverage and that they profit from the momentum generated by the information to 




use it in their work. When the media address an issue, politics follows suit and politicians 
increasingly start to talk about it (Eissler, Russell, & Jones, 2014; AUTHORS, 2006). This 
literature, faring under the header of ‘political agenda-setting and the media’, has showed that 
the media affect the political agenda in many countries, both in majoritarian and in 
proportional democracies (e.g. Bonafont & Baumgartner, 2013; Edwards & Wood, 1999; 
Soroka, 2002; Van Noije, Oegema, & Kleinnijenhuis, 2008; Walgrave, Soroka, & 
Nuytemans, 2008). Research that does not analyze elites’ behavior, but instead directly asks 
them where they get their information for action from, confirms the informational function of 
the media for political elites. For instance, a study among MPs in fifteen European countries 
showed that, according to their own saying, the media is one of the most frequently used 
‘sources of inspiration’ for parliamentary initiatives (AUTHORS, 2014). 
Whereas there is ample proof of the fact that politicians react to news coverage and 
actively engage with issue information provided by the media, most of this research 
concluded that politicians are by no means naïve or ordinary news consumers (Davis, 2007). 
They are rational actors that strategically use the media. Because typical media messages are 
better suited to nurture the opposition’s goal, destabilizing and embarrassing the government, 
opposition members more often profit from the window of opportunity provided by media 
information than members of government parties (Green-Pedersen & Stubager, 2010). Also, 
parties react more to media when the media cover issues that they ‘own’ than when they cover 
other issues (Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2011a, 2011b). Parties are advantaged regarding the 
issues they are considered to be the most competent on (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 
1996), which is why they strategically embrace the selective media information that plays to 
their advantage. Several studies have shown that political actors do not automatically react to 
media information as it becomes more salient, but mainly, or only, when this information fits 
their already existing issue agenda. So, the news not only provides useful information about 




topics and events, but offers a window of opportunity for some political actors to highlight 
their existing issue priorities (Elmelund-Præstekær & Wien, 2008; Kingdon, 1984; 
Yanovitsky, 2002). 
Not only the saliency of the information on issues encapsulated in the news creates a 
window of opportunity for politicians. News media also define and interpret issues. Older 
work by Kingdon (1984) on US congressmen found that opinionated and framed media 
information, media signals of which the political meaning has been defined, often has a higher 
informative value for political elites than bare-bone factual information. Facts that have been 
predigested require less effort for politicians to make up their mind and adopt a position. So, 
media frames increase or decrease the relevance of the underlying facts for elites. Recently, 
scholars have started to integrate elements of framing into classic political agenda-setting 
studies. Thesen’s work on Denmark is exemplary in this respect. He found that opposition 
parties ask more parliamentary questions about those issues that have been in the news 
negatively. And, they are especially active on issues when the triggering media story contains 
a responsibility frame blaming the government for the undesirable state of affairs (Thesen, 
2013, 2014). Van der Pas (2013) found that politicians in the Netherlands and Sweden mainly 
respond to media coverage when the media frames are closer to their own definition of the 
issue. This emphasizes, again, the strategic nature of political reactions to media coverage—
political actors employ media frames when they are congruent with their own position. As a 
consequence, media frames do not get picked up equally by political actors across the political 
spectrum. For instance, Vliegenthart & Roggeband showed that media coverage of 
immigration in the Netherlands after 9/11 was overwhelmingly driven by a so-called ‘Islam-
as-a-threat’-frame. This correlated with the discourse used by right-wing parties in parliament 
but most other parties kept on using their own frames and rejected the dominant media frame 
(Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007). 





The Arena Function 
Politicians get ‘pure’ information from the media and, at the same time, media information, 
through its salience and framing, creates an opportunity to act. But for politicians to reach out 
to the public, they need to become the object of coverage themselves. Being selected into the 
news, though, does not mean that you get what you want. This section distinguishes the mere 
acquisition of personal media attention for political actors (self-promotion) by accessing the 
media arena from being allowed to also get one’s message discussed (issue promotion) in that 
arena. 
For ordinary citizens, the news media are the dominant way to learn about most actors, 
issues and policies (Bennett & Entman, 2001). Mediation by the media is a precondition for 
the mediatization of politics (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2014). Since politicians in democracies 
need public support and since the media provide the most important channel to gain such 
support, political actors have little choice but to play the media game. Besides a direct 
electoral connection, presence in the media arena can also have indirect electoral effects. 
Parties may put candidates that successfully enter and perform in the media arena higher on 
the ballot list (Davis, 2010; AUTHOR, 2008) or mediatized candidates may attract more 
funding from sponsors (e.g. Heldman, Carroll, & Olson, 2005). The importance of entering 
and performing in the media arena goes well beyond elections. Kunelius and Reunanen 
(2012), for instance, show with a survey among Finnish elites that media attention can also 
strengthen one’s position in the policy process (see also Cook, 2005: 143). 
Ample studies have shown that the media arena follows standard practices and routines 
(Sparrow, 2006) that are a consequence of the function and aim of the media in modern 
society. The arena is ruled by news values (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; O’Neill & Harcup, 2009) 
and produces news in specific formats (Altheide & Snow, 1979). Thus, politicians’ media 




arena inclusion or exclusion is not random, but obeys a number of well-known criteria 
guiding news makers in their decisions regarding who is in and who is out. In other words, the 
news media form an institution characterized by recurring patterns of behavior and 
collectively shared beliefs of what is news (Cook, 2005). Journalists’ decisions to incorporate 
events or actors in the news and to give them the space to present their points of view are 
steered by particular media routines and standards of newsworthiness rather than by what 
political actors consider to be relevant (Wolfsfeld, 2011: 72; Cook, 2005: 63). To enter the 
media arena and to successfully get their version of the facts into the news, politicians need to 
learn and incorporate these media rules (Davis, 2007; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). The media 
arena is not a level playing-ground and in that respect not so different from the other arenas 
politicians operate in. Media routines advantage particular politicians, just like the rules in the 
parliamentary arena favor certain actors (e.g. the priority government initiatives get in most 
parliaments). Note that for politicians willing to enter the mass media, their competitors are 
not journalists, but rather other politicians (even of their own party) who vie for a place in the 
media spotlights as well. Journalists and editors impose the rules of the media game to the 
players, they can be considered as the referees that assess whether the actors play to the rules, 
but the real competitors are the other politicians. In sum, politicians have a strong interest in 
entering the media arena to communicate to the public and therefore they have to incorporate 
the media rules. 
A sizeable empirical literature supports the idea that getting access to the media arena is 
highly predictable. It is common knowledge that media attention is skewed in favor of actors 
with formal political power like presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, etc. (Bennett, 1996; 
Schönbach, De Ridder, & Lauf, 2001). Also for common politicians, for which access may 
even be more crucial, relative small status differences—e.g. for a parliamentarian: being a 
committee chair or not—are strong predictors of media exposure (Cook, 1986; Sellers & 




Schaffner, 2007; Tresch, 2009). Some studies suggest that working hard in parliament leads to 
more coverage (Bowler, 2010; Midtbø, 2011), while others found no such diligence effect 
(Fogarty, 2008; Tsfati, Markowitz Elfassi & Waismel-Manor, 2010). Scholars have also 
looked at non-institutional aspects to explain the media attention politicians get like their 
communication skills (Sheafer 2001) or physical attractiveness (Rosar, Klein, & Beckers, 
2008; Waismel-Manor & Tsfati, 2011). The news media prefer charismatic, communicative 
and attractive politicians but, at the same time, highly value the institutional status of elites 
and rather strengthen instead of challenge the politically defined hierarchy (Wolfsfeld, 2011). 
So, the rules of media access are to some extent specific to the media logic but they are also 
strongly related to essentially political and often institutional features of politicians (for an 
overview see Vos, 2014). 
Frequent media access may be a privilege of the powerful and a necessary condition for 
self-promotion, it does not automatically imply that the attention is positive. The favorability 
of news coverage  can be crucial in how citizens’ perceive a political actor, in particular in 
election times (e.g. Druckman & Parkin, 2005; Shaw, 1999). A lot depends on whether the 
covered actor gets the chance to promote the issue or frame he or she would like to get across 
to the public. In other words, mere media access does not imply that one is able to spin the 
story to one’s own advantage. A telling example is that of British PM Tony Blair, for a decade 
the most prominent politician in the British press, who, when he left office, expressed deep 
personal dissatisfaction with the role of the media in politics (Seaton, 2007). Paradoxically, 
Blair and his New Labour governments—sometimes called ‘The Sultans of Spin’—were 
frequently mentioned as a prime example of how politicians (ab)used the media to their 
advantage (e.g. Jones, 1995, 1999; Kuhn, 2002). The US literature too abounds with proof of 
how those in power, and the US President in particular, have successfully been able to 
broadcast their messages in the news. The combination of a strong institutional position, 




professional public relations techniques, and specialists in news management, makes the US 
government an exceptionally influential communicator often succeeding in getting its 
message out in the media (Kernell, 2007; Lieber & Golan, 2011; Manheim, 1998). For 
instance, several studies showed how, in the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration was 
successful in making its frame on the War on Terror prevail in the media (Bennett, Lawrence, 
& Livingston, 2007; Domke, Graham, Coe, Lockett John, & Coopman, 2006; Reese & Lewis, 
2009). According to Entman’s (2003) cascading activation model, the frame was initiated by 
the President and was taken over by other elites, amply broadcasted by the news media and, 
ultimately, adopted by the public. In line with Bennett’s indexing theory (1990), the 
government-sponsored War on Terror frame was initially left unchallenged by journalists, but 
simply covered time and again. As time went by, the media began to devote more attention to 
frames sponsored by alternative sources and the government spin regarding the War on Terror 
became less prevalent in the media (see also Glazier & Boydstun, 2012). 
The (temporally) dominant position of the US government’s message after 9/11 may not 
seem uncommon for scholars of US policy and media, but it is rather exceptional in many 
other countries. Most governments have less political communication resources and, more 
importantly, their messages are more often challenged by multiple actors. For instance, in 
European multi-party systems most political debates involve multiple political parties that 
each promote their definition and interpretation of the issue at stake (Slothuus & De Vreese, 
2010; Helbling, Hoeglinger, & Wüest, 2010). Even in the US, when looking at policy 
domains beyond foreign policy, there is a good deal of elite competition over messages in the 
news (Schaffner & Sellers, 2010). More often than not, frames are contested by counter-
frames (Chong & Druckman, 2013). In recent years, there is growing scholarly interest for 
these ‘framing contests’ among political actors in the news (see for example: Hänggli & 
Kriesi, 2010, 2012). 




The fact that the media form an indispensable arena for politicians to show themselves 
to the public and to highlight their version of reality, does not mean that all battles over the 
meaning of issues are fought out in the media arena. Sellers (2000) showed that in legislative 
debates in the US, the majority party mostly prefers to keep the debate inside congress, while 
the minority party has more to gain by expanding the debate to the media arena. In particular 
when its frame is more in line with public opinion, the opposition party can win a legislative 
battle over a party in government by going public. Political actors in a weaker institutional 
(minority) position need media access more than those having institutional political power. 
Yet, at the same time, the media prefer to give the stage to influential, executive actors and 
successfully making claims in the media arena is more difficult for opposition parties 
(Shehata, 2010). As a consequence, the news media largely broadcast the messages of the 
most powerful players in particular (Hänggli, 2012). 
This section distinguished two arena sub-functions: getting personal access to the media 
arena and getting your message across in that arena. Of course, both phenomena are 
connected. What a politician publicly states, and the way the message is framed, has a 
profound effect on whether he or she will make it into the news. One of elites’ access 
strategies, for example, is making a controversial statement. For backbenchers or newcomers, 
provocative statements are even more needed to be selected into the news. A recent study in 
the Netherlands shows how populist politicians like Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders were able 
to attract enduring media attention by consistently using blunt and often insulting language 
(Bos & Brants, 2014). 
 
Differentiating and Integrating Information and Arena 
We argued so far that the media exert a dual function for political actors. They are providers 
of information that can be passively consumed or actively used by politicians. And, they form 




an arena actors need access to in order to promote themselves or their issues. We reviewed the 
literature on media and politics and showed these functions and sub-functions to implicitly 
underlie a good many of the extant studies on media and politics. Making these implicit 
functional arguments explicit and turning them into a systematic functional framework is the 
primary contribution of our study. 
Yet, we think the usefulness of the functional framework for studying the relationship 
between media and politics could be further demonstrated. A functional framework not only 
allows to conveniently classify existing studies and create some order in the chaos. It also 
highlights the lacunae in the present literature that future work may want to focus upon. 
Concretely, in this section, we first show that differentiating political actors and functions 
allows for a better reading of what existing work actually taught us about the media’s 
interaction with politics. Second, we argue that most progress can be made by research 
integrating both functions and looking into how they interact. 
 
Differentiating Functions and Politicians 
The information and arena functions are more or less central to the goals and functioning of 
different types of politicians. Talking about the functions of the media for the politicians may 
not be a good idea, though. Our literature review showed there to be strong variations in the 
potential usefulness of the information and arena resources the media offer to different types 
of politicians. In other words, in the power struggle among political elites, the two functions 
play to the (dis)advantage of different political elites. We elaborate on this further by 
distinguishing three levels (micro, meso and macro) on which we can differentiate politicians 
from one another. 
On the micro-level, it is well-established that politicians with more formal power have 
a closer relationship with the media compared to politicians with lower political status. Power 




leads to a clear advantage in the media arena with more access leading to more chances to 
promote oneself and one’s pet issues. Yet, in terms of the usefulness of the media’s 
information for political actors other features of individual politicians seem to matter. 
Especially for generalist politicians and politicians who engage in partisan battle, for example, 
the daily menu of negative and conflictual news offers plenty of material they can work with 
(Sevenans, Walgrave, & Vos, 2015). So, distinct individual features affect arena access and 
information usefulness. While it is probably true that some individual politicians are 
structurally advantaged or disadvantaged by the mass media, it may well be the same 
politicians who experience an advantage in one function while at the same suffering from a 
disadvantage in the other function.  
The same applies to the meso-level. Here it is the government-opposition divide that 
counts. The existing studies suggest that differences between government and opposition 
politicians can be adequately tied to the media’s two functions, information and arena. While 
government actors have a clear structural advantage when it comes to the media as an arena, 
opposition actors are more served by the media as a source of information. With regards to the 
informational function, mass media coverage is more directly applicable and useful—and thus 
more advantageous—for opposition members. The opposition can use media coverage, in 
particular negative and conflictual stories, to challenge a minister’s plans or attribute 
responsibility for things going wrong (e.g. Thesen, 2012, 2013). Regarding the arena function, 
in contrast, the executive branch has a clear advantage and sidelines the opposition. In 
particular outside election times, powerful actors from the executive get more access to the 
media arena and they receive more space to promote themselves and their issues (Green-
Pedersen, Mortensen, & Thesen, 2015; van Dalen, 2011). 
At the macro-level, system characteristics may influence the role the media plays for 
different political elites. For instance, a political system in which power is shared among more 




actors may create a stronger competition for media access compared to systems with a limited 
number of political actors (Van Dalen & Van Aelst, 2014). At the same time, in a more 
fragmented system with less information asymmetry between government and opposition, 
media information may also be relevant for governmental actors and not just for the 
opposition. Characteristics of the media system as well, such as the degree of political 
parallelism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), may influence how different politicians are (un)able to 
use the media’s information and arena functions to reach their political goals. A recent study, 
for example, showed that Spanish parliamentarians mainly use the newspaper they are 
ideologically close to while Dutch MPs do not distinguish between ideologically close or 
distant newspapers as a source of information (Vliegenthart & Mena Montes, 2014). In 
contrast with research on micro- and meso-level factors, empirical research about the effect of 
system characteristics on the information and arena role of the media still is largely absent. 
In sum, it does not seem likely that some politicians are wholly advantaged and can 
invariably use the media to their own benefit, nor does it seem to be true that other politicians 
are fully deprived of employing the media for their own profit. Further research distinguishing 
kinds of politicians while examining how and why they differently employ the media’s 
information as well as arena function is likely to contribute to what we know about media and 
politics. 
 
Integrating the Information and Arena Function 
Apart from differentiating both functions and assessing how they play to the advantage of 
different politicians, a second rare but promising field of research does just the opposite: 
integrating both functions. While analytically distinct, in reality both functions are connected. 
Yet, we know little about how the information and arena functions of the media relate to each 
other. For example: To what extend does reacting to media information increase arena access? 




Media access is highly predictable with a small group of elite politicians dominating 
news coverage. The powerful initiate news stories while ‘ordinary’ politicians are forced to 
react to what is already in the news in order to get access to the media arena (Van Santen, Van 
Aelst, & Helfer, 2015; AUTHORS, 2014). Especially when the salience of a topic in the 
media strongly increases (irrespective of what political actors are doing) this opens up 
possibilities for a broader range of politicians to make it into the news (Kepplinger & 
Habermeier, 1995). A recent longitudinal Danish study showed, for instance, that when issue 
salience increases the media’s strong focus on government actors withers and opposition 
parties receive more coverage (Green-Pedersen et al., 2015: 11). In particular when an issue 
explodes on the news agenda and a media storm breaks, the news selection criteria 
temporarily change: journalists seek to satisfy the public’s need for more news about the 
triggering event or story (Boydstun, Hardy, & Walgrave, 2014). Such changes in the salience 
of certain issues do not suddenly make the media arena a level playing field, access remains 
selective, but backbenchers may become (temporarily) more newsworthy and gain access 
more easily. Wolfsfeld and Sheafer (2006) investigated how different types of ‘news waves’ 
provide media access opportunities to Members of the Knesset with different characteristics. 
Charismatic communication skills, they show, are important to get media access in so-called 
‘open waves’, while thematic expertise is more relevant in more restricted waves. 
On many other potentially important questions regarding how the arena and information 
functions of the mass media relate to each other, we do not even have the beginning of an 
answer. For example, to what extent does the media arena access of politicians form useful 
information for other politicians? We expect politicians to learn more from media information 
about problems and public opinion than about the political game itself, but we hardly have a 
clue of how pervasive the information function of the media really is. In sum, it is in 
investigating the interaction between both media functions that most progress is to be made. 






While the literature on media and politics is booming there is growing consensus that the 
media plays an important role in politics. However, little systematic attention has been given 
to why and how politicians use the media. Therefore, we took stock of the existing literature 
from the perspective of strategic political actors that use the mass media to reach their 
political goals and realize their ambitions. A functional actor-perspective, we argued, helps 
refocusing attention to the struggle for power between political elites and to go beyond the 
sterile debate about whether media or politics prevails. Media matter for political power as the 
information encapsulated in media messages is more relevant for some politicians and as 
gaining access to the media arena is unequally divided across politicians. 
The media has two core political functions, and these functions implicitly underlie 
most of the work on media and politics. The information function has a passive and an active 
component. Media can serve as a source of pure information, but that information can also be 
an instrument that is used by politicians. The arena function refers to the mass media as a 
unique platform to attract public attention. Politicians need to access this arena to get attention 
for themselves but also to promote their issues. We are not the first to make this distinction 
but we are novel in making it explicit and in showing that most work on media and politics 
can clearly be categorized as investigating one of these two functions or sub-functions. Our 
functional account of media and politics also clarifies why previous work came to different 
conclusions. Depending on the function one focuses upon or the actor one deals with, the 
dependency of politicians on the media may vary dramatically. Some political elites profit 
more from the media information and/or the media arena than others. 
Additionally, our functional account marks significant lacuna in our knowledge about 
media and politics. Most progress in the field can probably be made by looking into 




comparative differences across political and media systems in how the media are used by 
political actors. The relevance of the arena and information functions of the mass media differ 
across systems and across position holders in those systems. For example, the US president 
does not depend a lot on the media for his information and he can get access to the media any 
time. A backbencher opposition MP in a fragmented European country, gets a good deal more 
of his or her information from the mass media and has a hard time getting into the media. 
Differences between these two actors—both are called ‘elites’—in their dealings with the 
media are large and the field could profit from such a systematic comparative approach. 
We are aware that our functional approach may implicitly suggest that the media are 
passive actors and that the action only occurs on the side of politics. This is not the case, 
obviously. The media are active gatekeepers deliberately opening their gates for some 
politicians more than for others and/or consciously favoring some politicians’ issue promotion 
above others. Our point is precisely that politicians can use these systemic biases or skews in 
media information and, by adapting their behavior accordingly, can play the media arena. In 
doing the latter, political actors can beat a political opponent in the media arena but they 
cannot ‘beat’ the arena as such. Our approach is largely in line with Cook (2005) who holds 
that the media are a social institution that influences how things are done in politics. We 
acknowledge that sometimes this systematic influence of mass media coverage is 
complemented by an even more active role when certain media outlets become actors with 
their own political goals. In countries like the US, where partisan outlets are on the rise 
(Groeling, 2013), and in the UK, where partisan outlets have been a constant feature of the 
media system (Deacon & Wring, 2015), the media’s influence may go beyond the double 
function we conceptualized here. Yet, we believe that, rather than partisan or ideological, the 
main political role of the media is systemic and structural and thus best studied from the 




perspective of the political actors who are confronted with it and try to use it to their 
advantage. 
In this article we focused on what drives politicians to use the mass media in their work. 
Our functional approach might be applied more broadly than we did here. For example, while 
we mainly drew on studies dealing with the traditional print and audio-visual news media, it 
would be relevant to apply it to the entertainment media or to the rapid growing field of social 
media. Our approach also opens up perspectives to study other political actors than the ones 
we implicitly kept in mind here: elected individual politicians. So-called political outsiders 
such as social movement leaders, interest group activists or lobbyists, or insiders such as 
leading civil servants and bureaucrats employ the information and arena function of the media 
as well, yet differently. For non-elected actors there may be less balance in the double role the 
media play. For example, social movements mainly want to get into the media arena and they 
probably depend less on the media as a source of information, because as specialists on their 
topic or theme, they have plenty of expert information about the things they work on. Other 
actors such as bureaucrats might be less interested in the arena function, because they do not 
need to present themselves to the public, but may still find certain types of information 
presented in the media important for their work. What makes elected politicians unique is that 
they need the media for information and as an arena at the same time. It is this double bind 
that turns media into a formidable resource for politicians. 
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